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New proofs are given for Monjardet's theorem that all strong simple games (i.e.,
ipsodual elements of the free distributive lattice) can be generated by the median
operation. Tighter limits are placed on the number of iterations necessary. Com-
parison is drawn with the / function which also generates all strong simple
games.  1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. Introduction
In the preceding article, [3] we studied the composition of several
games. In such a composition, the voters of one game are replaced by com-
mittees each voting according to the rules of the other games. Here, we
remove the condition that the committees be disjoint. In fact, adding
dummy voters when necessary, we may assume without loss of generality,
that each of the committees is in fact on the entire set of voters. Thus, in
the generalized compound games considered here, the n voters vote k times
according to the rules of various games. These k results are combined via
a k-voter game. This process defines a new game, preserving the strength
andor simplicity of the original games.
As opposed to the situation with disjoint committees, here there is no
sense any irreducible strong simple games. Nevertheless, the three-voter
democracy Dem3 together with the n dictatorships can be singled out as
basic games, since when combined using this generalized composition,
they generate all n-voter strong simple games. This fact was proven by
Monjardet [6, 7]. However, a new proof is given here which makes no
reference to games which are not both simple and strong. This new proof
sets a tighter bound on the number of compositions required to generate
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all strong simple games, yet is completely elementary requiring no lattice
theory.
To generate all n-voter strong games, an additional basic game is needed.
It is the winning game
1 =[all subsets of V ]=(0. . .0)0 .
The notation (a1a2 } } } )q means that each voter i is given ai ``votes.''
A coalition wins if it attains the quota of q votes. Any game which can be
expressed in this notation is called a quota game.
Similarly, to generate all n-voter simple games, the losing game 0 is needed.
0 =<=(0. . .0)1 .
To generate all games, both 0 and 1 are needed as additional basic games.
Monjardet's proof makes use of the well-known identification of n-voter
games with points in the free-distributive lattice on n-generators FDn . [8]
The generators i themselves represent dictatorial games in which C is a
winning coalition if and only if the dictator i # C.
Given three elements of a distributive lattice S, T, U, one defines their
median to be the meet of their joins:
m(S, T, U )=ST+SU+TU=(S+T )(S+U )(T+U ).
In terms of games, the median law is the composition of the three games
with Dem3 .
FDn is a self-dual lattice. (The dual of any given element can be found
by expressing it in terms of the generators and exchanging ``meet'' with
``join'' throughout.) Many interesting properties of games can be expressed
in terms of this duality. In a strong game S (resp. simple, resp. strong
simple), we have SS* in FDn (resp. SS*, resp. S=S*). In the
language of free distributive lattices, this property is called supraduality
(resp. infraduality, resp. ipsoduality).
It is obvious that if S, T, U # FDn are all ipsodual (resp. infradual, resp.
supradual), then so will be their median, since
m(S, T, U )*=m(S*, T*, U*).
However, less obvious is the result proven by Monjardet that all ipsodual
elements can be generated from the n dictatorial games via repeated
application of the median operation.
Theorem 1 (Monjardet [6, 7]). Let FMn be the smallest set containing
the generators of FDn and closed under the median operation. Given S # FDn ,
S is ipsodual if and only if S # FMn .
131proof of monjardet's theorem
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In other words, strong simple games can be identified with elements of
the free median set. That is to say, all games can be thought of as composi-
tions of triples of simpler games, where the simplest games of all are
dictatorial.
See [3] for additional motivation and notation.
2. Quotient Games
Let S be a strong simple game with player set V, and let f : V  W be
some function. Define the quotient game f (S )=[AW : f (&1)(A) # S].
V can be thought of as a set of offices and W as a set of voters. f describes
which offices are held by which voters.
Voters which appear in no minimal winning coalitions are called dum-
mies, otherwise voters are called powerful. If f is non-surjective, then certain
voters will hold no office, and thus be dummies. If f is non-injective, then
certain voters will combine the functions of several offices. A single vote
of a voter is taken into account as the vote of each of his offices. If f is
bijective, then f (S ) is isomorphic to S.
Note that the minimal winning coalitions of f (S ) are the images of
certain minimal winning coalitions of S.
If S is a quota game, then f (S ) will also be a quota game in which the
weight of each voter is equal to the sum of the weights of his offices.
Our first proof of Theorem 1 depends on the following two lemmata.
Lemma 1. Let S be a game with voter set of V, and let f : V  W be
some function. Then f (S ) is a game on W. If S is strong (resp. simple), then
f (S ) is too.
Proof. f (&1) is a monotone function from 2W to 2V, thus f (S ) is a
game. Suppose S is simple, and B # f (S ). Then f (&1)(B) # S. Hence,
V& f (&1)(B)= f (&1)(W&B)  S. Strength follows as W&B  f (S ). K
Lemma 2. All nondictatorial strong simple games are the medians of
strong simple games with a strictly greater number of dummies.
Proof. Let x, y, z be distinct powerful voters. Let fij : V  V fix all
members of V with the exception of i for which fij (i )= j. We will show that
S=m( fxy(S ), fyz(S ), fzx(S )). (1)
If so, then we have expressed S in terms of strong simple games involving
at most n&1 powerful voters.
132 d. e. loeb
F
ile
:5
82
A
26
37
04
.B
y:
B
V
.D
at
e:
17
:0
1:
96
.T
im
e:
11
:3
1
L
O
P
8M
.V
8.
0.
P
ag
e
01
:0
1
C
od
es
:
27
57
Si
gn
s:
21
59
.L
en
gt
h:
45
pi
c
0
pt
s,
19
0
m
m
Let T denote the right hand side of Equation (1). Since |S |=|T |=2n&1,
it will suffice to show that ST. Suppose, A # S. Consider then the
possible values of |A & [x, y, z]|:
0. If x, y, z  A. Then A # fxy(S ), fyz(S ), fzx(S ). Thus, A # T.
1. Without loss of generality, suppose x # A, and y, z  A. Then
A # fyz(S ), fzx(S ), so A # T.
2. Without loss of generality, suppose x, y # A, and z  A. Then
A # fxy(S ), fzx(S ), so A # T.
3. If x, y, z # A. Then A # fxy(S ), fyz(S ), fzx(S ). Thus, A # T. K
Proof of Theorem 1. Since the number of dummies is bounded by
n&1, Monjardet's theorem now follows by induction. K
We have the following result more generally.
Theorem 2. Let S be a game (resp. strong game, resp. simple game, resp.
strong simple game) with at least two powerful voters. Then S is the median
of three games (resp. strong games, resp. simple games, resp. strong simple
games) with a strictly greater number of dummies.
Proof. If S is a strong simple game, then the lemma above suffices since
all nondictatorial games have at least two powerful voters.
If S has three or more powerful voters, then the above reasoning is still
valid.
If S has exactly two powerful voters (say x and y) then S must either be
the simple majority game xy=(1, 1, 0, 0, ...)2 or the strong majority game
x+ y=(1, 1, 0, 0, ...)1 . In the game xy, the participation of both x and y
are needed to win, whereas in x+y the participation of either is sufficient.
Notice that xy=m(Dictx , Dicty , 1 ) and x+y=m(Dictx , Dicty , 0 ) where
Dictx and Dicty denote dictatorship by w and y respectively. (Note that in
the games 0 and 1 , all voters are dummies.) K
Corollary 1. All games (resp. strong games, resp. simple games) can
be generated via generalized composition of various dictatorships, and the
three-voter democracy Dem3=(1, 1, 1)2 along with 0 and 1 (resp. 0 alone,
resp. 1 alone).
Proof. By induction, all games can be reduced via Dem3 to games of
the same ``type'' having only 0 or 1 powerful voters. The only games with
1 powerful voter are the dictatorships. The only games with no powerful
voters are the predetermined win 1 and the predetermined loss 0 . The
former is strong and the latter is simple. K
133proof of monjardet's theorem
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Note that the dictatorships along with 0 , 1 , or=(1, 1)1 and and=(1, 1)2
also form a minimal basis from which all games can be constructed. In
other words, all monotonic boolean functions can be written as, for
example, a conjunction of disjunctions.
3. Weight
Define the weight of a strong simple game S, to be the number of times
the median operation must be iterated in order to generate S from dic-
tatorships. In other words, a game S is of weight 0 if it is a dictatorship.
For k>0, S is of weight k if it is the median of three strong simple games
of weight k&1 or less, but not the median of three strong simple games of
weight k&2 or less.
Define Dem03 to be the unique one-voter strong simple game Dem1 and
Demd+13 =Dem3[Dem
d
3 , Dem
d
3 , Dem
d
3]. Dem
d
3 is clearly a transitive strong
simple game on 3d voters. A strong simple game has weight at most d if
and only if it is quotient of Demd3 .
Let W(n) be the largest weight of an n-voter strong simple game.
Proposition 1. (1) For n6, W(n) is given by the following table.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
W(n) 0 0 1 2 3 3
(2) For n6, W(n)n&3.
(3) W(n) is asymptotically greater than (ln 2ln 3) n.
(4) W(n) is weakly increasing, restricted growth function. I.e.
W(n+1) always equals either W(n) or W(n)+1.
Proof. (1) See Table I.
(2) By the proof of Theorem 1 above, the weight of a strong simple
game on n voters is no more than one greater than the largest such weight
on n&1 voters.
(3) Every n-voter strong simple game is a quotient of DemW(n)3 .
There are n3W(n) such quotients. Whereas, (see [1]) for n odd, the number
of strong simple games is asymptotically
2(
n&1
(n&1)2) exp \\
n&1
(n&1)2+ (2&(n&1)2+3n22&n&4&n2&n&2)
+\ n&1(n+3)2+ (2&(n+3)2+n22&n&6&n2&n&5)+ ,
134 d. e. loeb
F
ile
:5
82
A
26
37
06
.B
y:
B
V
.D
at
e:
17
:0
1:
96
.T
im
e:
11
:3
1
L
O
P
8M
.V
8.
0.
P
ag
e
01
:0
1
C
od
es
:
25
61
Si
gn
s:
14
55
.L
en
gt
h:
45
pi
c
0
pt
s,
19
0
m
m
and for n even,
2(
n&1
n2 ) exp \\
n&1
n2&1+ (2&n2&1+n2&n&4)
+\ nn2+1+ (2&n2&1+n22&n&5&n2&n&4)+ .
In either case, taking the double logarithm of these asymptotic formulas
yields
W(n)p
n ln 2
ln 3
&
ln ln n
ln 3
&
ln ((ln 2)22?)
ln 9
+O(n&1).
(4) W(n) is a restricted growth function by the Proof of Theorem 1.
Now, let S be an n-voter strong simple game of weight W(n). Let
@(S )=S _ [A _ [n+1] : A # S] be the corresponding n+1-voter game in
which the additional voter is powerless. By hypothesis, @(S ) is a quotient of
DemW(n+1)3 . However, S= fn, n+1(@(S )) is a quotient of @(S ). Thus, S is a
quotient of DemW(n+1)3 . Hence, W(n+1)W(n). K
4. Choice Function
A finite multi-player deterministic sequential-move perfect-knowledge
game can be represented by a labeled rooted tree. The label of an internal
node indicates which player must move. His move consists of the selection
of a child of that node. The label of a leaf indicates the winner of the game.
Without loss of generality, we can consider only binary trees, since choices
between a large number of possibilities can be made via iterated binary
choices.
The win-type of a game-tree is its set of winning coalitions. A coalition
is said to be winning if it has a combined strategy that ensures that the
winner of the game will be one of its members.
Let { be the game-tree
a
\ + , (2){1 {2
where {1 and {2 are sub-game-trees with win-types S1 and S2 respectively,
and a # V is a player. What is the win-type S of the game {?
135proof of monjardet's theorem
F
ile
:5
82
A
26
37
07
.B
y:
B
V
.D
at
e:
17
:0
1:
96
.T
im
e:
11
:3
1
L
O
P
8M
.V
8.
0.
P
ag
e
01
:0
1
C
od
es
:
26
76
Si
gn
s:
18
85
.L
en
gt
h:
45
pi
c
0
pt
s,
19
0
m
m
Obviously, AV wins { if it wins both {1 and {2 . Moreover, if a # AV,
then A can win { even if it wins only one of {1 and {2 . Thus, S=
(S1 & S2) _ [A # S1 _ S2 : a # A]. We will denote this combination of S1
and S2 by /a(S1 , S2) and call it the choice by a between S1 and S2 .
Proposition 2. (1) The win-type of a game-tree is a strong simple
game.
(2) Conversely, all strong simple games are the win-type of some
game-tree.
Proof. (1) By induction on game-trees.
If the height is zero, then the tree is trivial. It contains one node. The
game is an automatic win for some player. A coalition is winning if and
only if it contains this player. The win-type is a dictatorship by this player.
Otherwise, { is the form /a(S1 , S2) where S1 and S2 are strong simple
games. Let a # A and B=X"A. If A  /a(S1 , S2), then A  S1 and A  S2 .
Thus, B # S1 and B # S2 . Thus, B # /a(S1 , S2). Conversely, if A # /a(S1 , S2),
then A # S1 or A # S2 . In either case, B  /a(S1 , S2).
(2) Consider the following game. Players take turns eliminating all
but one of the coalitions in S to which they belong (if any). After each
player has taken his turn there will be one set left. The first member of this
set wins. K
Thus, the functions /a together with the dictatorships can be used to
generate all strong simple games.
Alternate Proof of Theorem 1. Notice that /a(S, T )=m(S, T, Dicta);
m(S, T, Dicta)=(S & T ) _ (S & Dicta) _ (T & Dicta)
=(S & T ) _ [A : a # A # S] _ [A : a # A # T]
=/a(S, T ).
Since / generates all strong simple games, a fortiori m does. K
5. Depth
In analogy to Monjardet's definition of weight, define the depth of a
strong simple game S, to be the number of times choice functions must be
iterated in order to generate S from dictatorships. In other words, a game
S is of depth 0 if it is a dictatorship. S is of depth k>0 if it is the choice
by some player between two strong simple games of depth k&1 or less, but
not between two strong simple games of depth k&2 or less.
136 d. e. loeb
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S is of depth k if it is the win-type of a game-tree of height k and no such
game-tree of lesser height. Let Bk be the complete binary tree of height k.
Label the nodes of Bk consecutively with the integers 1 to 2n+1&1.
1
1
B0=(1), B1=\ + , and B2=\ 2 3 +2 3 |a |a4 5 6 7
S is of depth k if and only if it is a quotient of the 2n+1&1 voter strong
simple game Bk .
Let D(n) be the largest depth of an n-voter strong simple game.
Proposition 3. (1) The depth of any strong simple game is at least as
great as its weight. Thus, D(n)W(n).
(2) D(n) is nondecreasing.
(3) D(n) is asymptotically greater than n.
(4) D(n) is asymptotically less than ?2n372.
(5) Let S be a strong simple game of weight w. S has depth at most
2w&1. This bound cannot be improved in general.
Proof. (1) /a(S, T )=m(S, T, Dicta).
(2) Let S be an n-voter strong simple game of depth D(n). Let @(S )
be the corresponding n+1-voter game in which the additional voter is
powerless. Let @(S) be the win-type of an n+1-player game-tree of depth
d. Since the additional player is powerless, we can arbitrarily relabel nodes
of the game-tree to form an n-player game-tree of win-type S. Thus,
D(n+1)dD(n).
(3) There are n2d+1&1 ways to label Bd with n players. Thus, there are
at most n2d+1&1 n-player strong simple games of depth d or less. Compare
with [1].
(4) Proof of Proposition 2.
(5) Let { (resp. {$, {") be the game-tree of Demw&13 with voters
labelled 1 to 3w&1 (resp. 3w&1+1 to 2_3w&1, 2_3w&1+1 to 3w). Place
a copy of {$ and {" under each leaf of {. The resulting tree is the game-tree
of Demw3 . By induction, the height of the tree is 2
w&1.
137proof of monjardet's theorem
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No smaller tree can represent Demw3 since every vertical chain in a game-
tree gives rise to a winning coalition and Demw3 has no winning coalitions
smaller than 2w. K
Given a strong simple game S, and two voters x, y # V. Say that x is at
least as influential as y, written x y or xS y if for all A # S, we have
(A&[ y]) _ [x] # S.
Proposition 4. Influence is a pre-order on the set of voters.
Proof. (Reflexivity) Let x # A # S. Then (A&[x]) _ [x]=A # S.
(Transitivity) Let xyz. Let x # A # S. Then y # B=(A&[x]) _
[ y] # S. Hence, C=(B&[ y]) _ [z] # S. Note that C=(A&[x]) _ [z]. K
If S is a quota game, then the influence relation is total. wxwy implies
xy.1
In the proof of Lemma 2, we define fxy(S ). Informally, Sxy= fxy(S ) is the
voting scheme in which x ``leaves the room'' having left instructions to vote
according to y. Thus,
Sxy=[A : y  A and A # S, or y # A and A _ [x] # S].
Similarly, we can imagine a voting scheme Sxy in which x ``leaves the
room'' having left instructions to vote against y. Thus,
Sxy=[A : y # A # S, or y  A and A _ [x] # S].
Proposition 5. Let S be a game. Sxy is a game if and only if x is less
influential than y, xS y.
Proof. Sxy is a game if and only if whenever A # Sxy , we have
A _ [a] # Sxy for all a # V.
Suppose A # Sxy . If a{y, then A _ [a] # Sxy , since S is a game.
On the other hand, let a=y. The condition A _ [ y] # Sxy is of interest
only if y  A. In that case, it reduces to the question of whether A _ [x] # S
implies A _ [ y] # S. In other words, whether xS y. K
Let S=(w1 , w2 , ..., wn)q be a quota game. Without loss of generality,
suppose w1wn . Then
Sn1=(w1+wn , w2 , w3 , ..., wn&1 , 0)q (3)
138 d. e. loeb
1 Nevertheless, the influence relation on S6, 23 is total 1>2t3>4t5>6, yet S6, 23 is not
a quota game. See Appendix.
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and
Sn1=(w1&wn , w2 , w3 , ..., wn&1 , 0)q&wn (4)
are both quota games. If S was a homogeneous or efficient quota game (i.e.,
all minimal winning coalitions equal the quota), then so is Sn1 and Sn1 .
The opposition Sxy plays the same role in choice function / decomposi-
tions as the quotient Sxy= fxy(S ) played in median decompositions
(Lemma 2).
Proposition 6. Let S be a strong simple game, and suppose iS j. Then
S=/i (Sij , Sij).
Proof. Say A needs i if A # S and A&[i ]  S. Clearly, if A # S does not
need i, then A # Sij and A # Sij . Thus, A # /i (Sij , Sij).
If A # S needs i, then either j # A in which case A # Sij or j  A in which
case A # Sij . In either case, A # /i (Sij , Sij). K
Informally, this means that S is a ``choice'' by player i of whether to join
forces with player j or to oppose him.
Corollary 2. If S is a n-voter quota game (n3), then S has weight
at most n&2.
Proof. By induction, and Eqs. (3) and (4). K
Lemma 2 [2] can be thought of as the converse of Corollary 2, since it uses
methods similar to equations (3) and (4) to enumerate all quota games.
Note however that for some strong simple games, no pair of distinct
voters are comparable via influence. The only example with less than seven
vertices is the icosahedral game I=S6, 30 : Associate each of six voters with
a pair of opposite vertices on an icosahedron. A coalition is winning if and
only if it contains a face. (See Appendix.)
Such games prevent us from generalizing the reasoning of Corollary 2.
Appendix: Classification of Strong Simple Games
In Table I, we classify strong simple games according to their height and
weight. Table I includes all 30 isomorphism classes of strong simple games
with up to six powerful voters, as well as those with a transitive auto-
morphism group and up to eight powerful voters, and those of weight or
height up to two. Each isomorphism class is listed only once.
139proof of monjardet's theorem
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TABLE I
Classification of Strong Simple Games
n S w m-Median decomposition d /-Choice decomposition
1 (1)1 0  0 
3 (111)2 1 m((100)1, (010)1, (001)1) 1 /3((100)1, (010)1)
4 (2111)3 2 m((1110)2, (1101)2, (1011)2) 2 /4((1000)1, (1110)2)
5 (22111)4 2 m((11100)2, (11010)2, (11001)2) 2 /5((11100)2, (11010)2)
5 (31111)4 2 m((10000)1, (11100)2, (10011)2) 2 */1((11100)2, (10011)2)
5 (32211)5 2 m((11100)2, (11010)2, (10101)2) 3 /5((21110)3, (11100)2)
5 (11111)3 3 m((20111)3, (12011)3, (01211)3) 3 /5((01110)2, (21110)3)
6 (411111)5 3 m((100000)1, (310111)4, (001000)1) 3 /6((100000)1, (311110)4)
6 (522211)7 3 m((100000)1, (320211)5, (001000)1) 3 /6((311110)4, (211100)3)
6 (433111)7 3 m((100000)1, (130111)4, (001000)1) 3 /3((130111)4, (100000)1)
6 (533211)8 3 m((100000)1, (230211)5, (001000)1) 4? /6((211100)3, (322110)5)
6 (422111)6 2 m((100000)1, (111000)2, (000111)2) 2 */1((111000)2, (000111)2)
6 (543221)9 3 m((100000)1, (120110)3, (013111)4) 3 /3((120110)3, (310111)4)
6 (332111)6 2 m((111000)2, (110100)2, (001011)2) 3 /6((111000)2, (221110)4)
6 (432211)7 2 m((111000)2, (110100)2, (100011)2) 3 /6((211100)3, (221110)4)
6 (542222)9 3 m((100000)1, (220111)4, (013111)4) 3 *?/1((220111)4, (013111)4)
6 (332221)7 3 m((301111)4, (120110)3, (012110)3) 3 /2((301111)4, (001110)2)
6 (222111)5 3 m((301111)4, (130111)4, (013111)4) 3 /2((301111)4, (002111)3)
6 (322211)6 3 m((301111)4, (230211)5, (013111)4) 3 /2((301111)4, (102211)4)
6 (211111)4 3 m((301111)4, (220111)4, (013111)4) 3 /6((211100)3, (221110)4)
6 S6, 21 3 m((100000)1, (120101)3, (012110)3) 3 *?/1((120101)3, (012110)3)
6 S6, 22 3 m((100000)1, (221110)4, (010112)3) 3 *?/1((221110)4, (010112)3)
6 S6, 23 3 m((03111)4, (102110)3, (310111)4) 3 /2((200111)3, (102110)3)
6 S6, 24 3 m((021110)3, (102101)3, (210110)3) 3 /6((122110)4, (211210)4)
6 S6, 25 3 m((031111)4, (102101)3, (310111)4) 3 /6((122110)4, (221110)4)
6 S6, 26 3 m((021110)3, (203112)5, (210110)3) 4? /6((122110)4, (311220)5)
6 S6, 27 2 m((000001)1, (111000)2, (001110)2) 2 /6((111000)2, (001110)2)
6 S6, 28 2 m((110001)2, (101010)2, (011100)2) 3 /3((110001)2, (110221)4)
6 S6, 29 3 m((200111)3, (020111)3, (002111)3) 3 /1((020111)3, (002111)3)
6 I=S6, 30 3 m((302112)5, (230121)5, (023211)5) 5? *2m(S6, 28, (111220)4)
7 B2 2 m((1110000)2, (0001110)2, (0000001)1) 2 */7((1110000)2, (0001110)2)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (0001110)2, (0000111)2) 3 /1((0011221)4, (0101221)4)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (1001100)2, (1000011)2) 3 /2(S6, 27, (3001111)4)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (0011100)2, (0000111)2) 3 /7(S6, 27, S$6, 27)
7 Fano 4? m(S6, 22, S$6, 22, S"6, 22) 5?*a /7(S6, 22, /7(S $$$6, 22, S$$$$6, 22))
7 (1111111)4 3 m((201111)4, (1201111)4, (0121111)4) 4? /7((1111100)3, (2111110)4)
8 2 m \(11100000)2, (00011100)2 ,(00000111)2 + 3 /8(S6, 27, S$6, 27)
9 Dem3
b 3 m \(11100000)2, (00011100)2 ,(00000111)2 + 3 /9(B2,B$2)
a The players in the Fano game are identified with points in the projective plane over the
field Z2 . A coalition wins if it contains a line. Proposition 6 does not apply.
b Proposition 6 does not apply to games whose influence relation is trivial such as the
icosahedral game I.
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Games S are grouped according to their number n of powerful voters as
indicated in the first column. The second column provides the weights of
a quota game if applicable, or otherwise identifies the game S. The remain-
ing columns give the weight w and depth d of the game S along with some
optimal decompositions. Those cases where our methods do not give (or
are not known to give) optimal decompositions are marked V (or V?).
A question mark appears when optimality of d or w is uncertain. A
appears in the first column if the game has a transitive automorphism
group.
Note added in proof. Avishai Wool recently pointed out that Toshihide Ibaraki (inde-
pendently of the work by Bernard Monjardet and this author) gave a proof (Toshihide
Ibaraki, A theory of coteries: Mutual exclusion in distributed systems, IEEE Trans. Parallel
Distrib. Systems 4, No. 7 (1993), 779794) of Theorem 1 by showing that D(n) is finite.
References
1. A. D. Korshunov, Families of subsets of a finite set and closed class of Boolean functions,
in ``Extremal Problems for Finite Sets (Visegrad, 1991),'' Bolyai Society Mathematical
Studies, Vol. 3, pp. 375396, Janos Bolyai Math. Soc., Budapest, 1994.
2. J. R. Isbell, On the enumeration of majority games, Math. Tables and Other Aids Comput.
13 (1959), 2128.
3. D. E. Loeb, The fundamental theorem of voting schemes, J. Comb. Theory Ser. A 72
(1995), 120129.
4. D. E. Loeb, Stable winning coalitions, ``Proceeding of the Workshop on Combinatorial
Games,'' Math. Sci. Res. Inst., 1994 (S. Levy, R. Nowakowski, and R. Guy, Eds.), Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, to appear.
5. D. E. Loeb and A. Meyerowitz, The maximal intersecting family of sets graph, J. Comp.
Theory Ser. A, submitted.
6. B. Monjardet, Characte risation des e le ments ipsoduaux du treillis distributif libre, C. R.
Acad. Sci. Paris Se r. A 274 (1972), 1215.
7. B. Monjardet, E le ments ipsoduaux du treillis distributif libre et familles de Sperner
ipsotransversales, J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 19 (1975), 160176.
8. Th. Skolem, Uber gewisse ``Verbande'' ober ``Lattices,'' Avh. Norske Vid. Akad. Oslo
(1936), 116.
141proof of monjardet's theorem
